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The Art of Self and Becoming a
Professional
by Jack L. Sammons*
I. A RELIABLE

RESOURCE

This talk about the self originated in comments made by Joshua
Bishop. Josh was executed by the People of the State of Georgia on March
31, 2016. Now I have long puzzled over questions of the self, especially in
the context as here of students and practitioners who are in the process
of becoming professionals; so the issues were not new to me although I
had never gotten very far with them. But Josh's comments, when I first
heard them, seemed to me to be a uniquely reliable resource for returning
to these issues again. 1 He spent most of his life facing his death in the
way that few of us ever do, living his life as he did in a place called "death"
row surrounded by others for whom death was also a daily reality. In
addition, Josh was moved by his crimes and his need to find meaning in
his death, and thus in his life, to a constant reexamination of the issue of
the unity and consistency of his own self.2 Was he still that nineteenyear-old kid who killed two people? His perspective on death then was a
*Griffin B. Bell Professor of Law Emeritus, Mercer University School of Law.
1. Near the end of this Article I return to something I have argued before, although
never argued before in its application to the self or to becoming professional. It would be
wrong, I hope, to think that I was merely seeing in Josh's comments and life what I wanted
to see or that I was using his life as a way of saying things I had already thought, although
I do understand how one could think that. While of course all of the thinking he prompted
was prompted for me in the context of my own prior thoughts, there is not a thought in this
article that did not in some sense arise from my own contemplation of Josh's life over the
past six months with the great help of Sarah Gerwig-Moore, Amy Dunn, and others who
worked closely with him. Most specifically, I would never have arrived at the central theme,
i.e., that there is an art of self which can be offered to those becoming professionals, without
him. This Article then is dedicated to Joshua Bishop and to those, like Sarah, Amy, and
many others, through whom I came to know him.
2. "There were so many days when Joshua believed his life didn't matter and he would
die having lived a meaningless life. I think that is what he feared the most, not death." Email from Amy Dunn to Author (June 9, 2016) (on file with Author) (published with permission).

741

742

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

unique one; a Heideggerian perspective in which our lives are uncovered
for us in facing our deaths, 3 for Josh lived with his death more honestly
than most of us ever do. Because of this, his was also a unique perspective
on what it means to be alive, what it means to exist as a "self."
Not long before his execution, Josh had one of many conversations with
Amy Dunn, a person he first contacted in her admissions office capacity
at The Art Institute of Atlanta, seeking her help finding a mentor for his
art. Amy and her husband, Ryan, soon became close friends with Josh
and founding members of a group of supporters called "Team Joshua." In
this conversation, Josh's thoughts turned, as they often did, to death. 4
"We die two deaths," he told Amy, "the first one is when our soul leaves
our body, and the second is the death which occurs when someone speaks
your name out loud for the last time."5 Notice that Josh was not saying
that we are kept alive in memory; not saying that there is a metaphorical
or analogical self which remains after our physical death. This second
death is not a romantic claim, but a realistic and powerful one about our
very existence as selves. Who we are, he is saying, our identity as a self,
is not to be found in a singular physical presence, but is there in our relationship with others. Our existence as a self then is a co-dependent coexistence. Since there are multiple others, multiple ways of relating to
each, and all of this is within a constantly ongoing process, we, each one
of us, is a multiplicity of selves existing in the form of a single self, a
"singular plural" in Jean Luc Nancy's felicitous term.6 I exist, in other
words, because others do in any sense of "I" sufficient to include our full
"two deaths" existence as a self.
In this understanding of the self there is no "core'" self or "essential"
self or "true" self to turn or return to inwardly, for such conceptions of

3. Here is a very brief description of Heidegger's view on this which avoids most of the
troublesome Heideggerian terms: "The [slelf emerges only with the breakdown of the self.
This breakdown takes place in an experience of dissolution, which occurs most palpably in
an encounter with death. One must bear in mind that the experience of dissolution through
death is not necessarily relegated to the actual physical event, even though the awareness
of one's own earthly demise is also crucial to Dasein's transformation to self-possession.
Death is that moment when Dasein confronts the contingency of human reality in all of its
complexity." BRIAN J. BRAMAN, MEANING AND AUTHENTICITY: BERNARD LONERGAN AND
CHARLES TAYLOR ON THE DRAMA OF AUTHENTIC HUMAN EXISTENCE 18-19 (2008).

4. Amy Dunn, Eulogy for Joshua Bishop, FACEBOOK (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.fac
ebook.com/groups/TeamJoshuaAlways/ (posting in Facebook Group For Joshua). This eulogy was delivered at a Mass and a Memorial Service for Joshua Bishop.
5. Id. As so many good thoughts do, this thought, Amy said, arose for Josh in a conversation with a friend, Emmanuel Hammond, a fellow death row inmate who was executed
by the People of the State of Georgia on July 25, 2011. E-mail from Amy Dunn to Author
(June 9, 2016) (on file with Author).
6.

See JEAN LUC NANCY, BEING SINGULAR PLURAL (2000).
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the self leave out that which is most essential to our existence as selves,
that is, our existence being a co-dependent co-existence. 7 If I were to seek
a core or essential or true self I would, to be true to that self, have to seek
out the ones in you, all of you, who are also me as well, and rediscover
who I am in my relationship to those. And thus, according to Josh, the
boundary between self and other is always uncertain, always shifting,
and, well, enigmatic, even, as Josh teaches, in the context of that which
seems most personal to us, our deaths.8
Thus, our reliable resource is telling us, each of us is a multiplicity of
selves. There is something essential about our existence as selves that
any understanding of a core 9 self necessarily leave out. No one can escape
this. There is no "I" prior to the "we" who is you. Co-existence is not something added to the self (as if it were something communal or sentimental
or romantic or some imaginary universal "we"); it is the self "primordial,"
as Richard Niebuhr put the same point some time ago. 10 Even in our most
solitary, isolated, internal, walled off existence, we assume a spectator if
nothing else,11 and thus the reality of our selves denies to us any attempt

7. The most beautiful, and for me most important, article I read in preparation for
this paper is one by Catherine Keller. See Catherine Keller, EnigmaticExperiences: Spirit,
Complexity, and Person, in IN SEARCH OF SELF: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON
PERSONHOOD 301 (J. Wentzel van Huyssteen & Erik P. Wiebe eds., 2011). She begins her
article with a meditation on 1 Corinthians13:12 which she then, convincingly I think, retranslates as "Now we see in a mirror, in an enigma, but then person to person." Id. This is
a wonderful way of saying what I mean to be saying in the text in a different register.
8. This is all difficult to describe as you can tell. Here is Catherine Keller's version:
"The personal is always already the interpersonal. But the interpersonal is always already
the transpersonal, more than personal, signifying the vast multiplicity of impersonal energies embodied in and cross through each person. At the same time, the person is in transit,
moving beyond itself and into as yet unfathomable relations - and getting in its own way
all along." Keller, supranote 7, at 301-04.
9. The three terms I have been using, "core," "essential," and "true" have different
histories. See Pamela Cooper-White, Reenactors: Theological and PsychologicalReflections
on "CoreSelves," Multiplicity and the Sense of Cohesion, in IN SEARCH OF SELF, supra note
7, at 141. The differences, however, are unimportant for us so for the rest of this Article
these terms are collapsed into the one term, "core" self.
10.

H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF: AN ESSAY IN CHRISTIAN MORAL

PHILOSOPHY (1963). "To be a self in the presence of other selves is not a derivative experience but primordial." Id. at 71.
11. "Nothing and nobody exists in this world whose very being does not presuppose a
spectator." HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND 19 (Mary McCarthy ed., Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt 1981) (emphasis omitted).
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at any autonomous singular existence within. We exist in "mutual abandonment and exposure to each other," Nancy says. Or, in Judith Butler's
pithy expression: "we undo each other."1 2
And yet each self is singularly unique, and we are, again with Nancy,
not just a plural but a "singularplural." How can this be?
Perhaps, and we can see this clearly in Josh's life as well, it is because
around each of us is formed a world: a world of selves, of others, of relationships among all of these, of projects, creations, discoveries, time, a
world of meaning, and on and on. From Josh we also get the idea that
this world has a semiotic nature. It exists in language in other words (and
is necessarily social, cultural, and relational in this way as well). By telling each of us that our lives continue until our name is no longer spoken,
he has said this in perhaps the clearest and certainly the most dramatic
way it has ever been said. In this each self is, according to Nancy again,
an "access" 13 to a world appearing as existence, each a "singularity."14 For
Nancy this is "access to the scattered origin in its very scattering," 5 but
we need not follow his Heidegger-inspired language here. It is enough for
our purposes, I think, to say that in each self there is the birth of a world
to which this self, and this self alone, gives us access. It is a world in
which the mystery of our existence is uncovered for us in a unique, a
singular way.16 And thus each self in its multiplicity is unique, is a singularity, for the world will never disclose itself again in the way it does
through each of us.
It is this "access" I think Josh referred to when he said our lives continue until the last time our name is spoken. It is this, is it not, to which
our names actually refer? Given to us as they usually are by others, after
our birth but prior to the existence of our self, we can perhaps see most
clearly the social nature of our existence as selves in our names. Names,
we know, are speech acts for the name is created in the speaking of it,
but perhaps they are also speech acts in the sense of founding the self
Josh is describing. Perhaps in their first speaking they reference the access you are to become for others. Perhaps our selves then are in a very
real sense born when our names are first spoken; so of course it makes

12.

JUDITH BUTLER, GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF ONESELF 20 (2005) (quoting Keller, supra

note 7, at 303).
13. NANCY, supranote 6, at 14.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. "For it remains our awareness of our own complex transpersonal becoming, our
self-awareness of and as such processes, that at once confuses and humanizes us." Keller,
supra note 7, at 308 (emphasis omitted).
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sense to say, as Josh did, that we die a second death the last time our
name is spoken.17
It is a leap, but not a large one-and it need not be a leap of faithfrom this to an understanding of the soul. 18 Surely this is part of what
Josh, as a devoted Catholic, had in mind. But what of it? What does all
of this admittedly esoteric discussion of our existence as selves have to
do with becoming a professional?
II. AN EXISTENTIAL ANXIETY

We, as teachers of the professions, ask students to "become" something
different from who they have been because our virtue laden practices require this. Our pedagogical task, we say to ourselves, is not just one of
knowledge, skills, and attitude, but a "becoming" of a certain type of person as one pursues a practice. If this is so, however, and I certainly believe it is, we are implicitly offering to these students the potential of an
authentic way of life. If this is not what we are doing, then we are monstrous.
Surely all good practices depend upon this "becoming." Each requires
that the practice be more for its practitioners than a mere role sometimes
played, sometimes not; more than a mask put on or taken off at will, and
more than a costume one wears when it is expected. The morals of practices-most especially their virtues-the ethics of practices, and the
meaning of a life well lived within a practice and as a practitionerdepend
upon there being this "more." What we think of as the ethics of a practice,
for example, are reduced to mere regulations, indeed to unenforceable
ones, if this is not so.
So we ask students to change; to become professionals. We ask them
not just to acquire the virtues of our practices, but to instantiate them.
Good students, those most attuned to their circumstances and their
world, those, that is, with the greatest potential as professionals, know
that this is what is being asked of them; they know as well that this raises
the question "Who am I?" of necessity; and it is frightening. Whatever
security practices may have offered in the past; whatever security they
still may be able to offer in some remote corners, what seems on offer to
most of these students in becoming a professional is not now adequate to
replace the security of who they now think themselves to be. Because this

17. Josh is in good company here: "Death as such, like birth as such, takes place in
language; it takes place in and through being-with-one-another. Death is the very signature
of the 'with': the dead are those who are no longer 'with'. . . ." NANCY, supra note 6, at 89.
18. Notice in this potential understanding of soul, the core self is not only not your soul,
but a denial of the soul you do have. One can easily see that there are theological implications afoot here.
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is true, our students face what Erik H. Erikson, "the 'founder' of psychological identity theory,"19 described as an "existential anxiety" in "the
awareness of the finiteness and relativity of human existence, and of the
plain fact that 'nonbeing' is possible." 20 And yet, Erikson teaches, this
very anxiety is also fundamental to any sense of self for only through it
can one uncover the sense of agency-the continuity and the unity of a
self-we depend upon for personal meaning.21
Our students often express this anxiety in terms of "their" morals and
ethics, and we most typically express the pedagogical problems this anxiety creates for us this way as well. But it is more than this. It is, as
Erikson suggests, their meaning that is at stake: not a meaning to be
found in morality, but the very meaning of their existence as selves. So
of course it is right for them to be frightened! Being asked to become
something different in our times, as Charles Taylor argued in Sources of
Self,22 means being asked to become unhinged as a self in a culture in

which all meaning is fragmented, indeed the self itself can be fragmented. 23 Facing this, Taylor says, the individual flees into itself in flight
from our postmodern culture in an attempt to secure a meaningful life. 24
This fleeing takes the form of a firm insistence upon an untouchable and
autonomous core self, the self of "to thine own self be true" parodied by
Shakespeare. It is to this our students go, into a private world of one that
is conceptually distinct from any social role they might have, for the
agency, and therefore meaning, that a sense of unity and consistency in
their lives makes possible.
It is no wonder then that our students are made existentially anxious
by being asked to become something different. In fleeing to a core self

19. Hetty Zock, The ExistentialSelf in a Culture of Multiplicity: HerbertHerman's Theory of the DialogicalSelf, in IN SEARCH OF SELF, supra note 7, at 163.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY

(1989).
23. TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 22, at 16-36, and throughout. On fragmentation of the self, see Leon Turner, Disunity and Disorder:The "Problem"ofSelf Fragmentation, in IN SEARCH OF SELF, supra note 7.
24. TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 22. Additionally, in our times the "finiteness" to which Erikson referred is made palpably present to all of us through the technological threat of a reduction of our selves to purely biological datum, a threat we can now
see all around us in the development of biometric technologies. For example: fingerprint
identifying smartphones and security apps; retina scans at immigration points; required,
chip embedded, identity cards; DNA mappings; computer programs which communicate in
personal ways to a "you" identified only by a code sent from your computer; and, eventually,
required microchips implants at birth, something which seems at times indistinguishable
from Nazi tattoos. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, NUDITIES 48-53 (2011).
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removed from others, from relationships, from social roles, from life projects, and so forth, these students can. get a sense of avoiding "personal"
responsibility for who they are in their actions in the world-a refuge for
them, but something no practice can accept from its practitioners if it is
to remain a practice.
But, as Josh teaches us, and as we find mostly confirmed in the current
thinking within the neurosciences, the biological sciences, anthropology,
philosophy, psychology, and theology, there is no core self to which to
flee. 25 It is an illusion. 26 This is not to say it doesn't exist; it is to say that
it does not and cannot reflect the reality of anyone's existence. In an effort
to be authentic by being "true to themselves," our fleeing students doom
themselves to living inauthentically, for it is almost impossible from the
stance of a core self for them to make their lives their own.
In a 2008 book by Daniel Markovits entitled, A Modern Legal Ethics:

Adversary Advocacy in a DemocraticAge 27-a book wrong in its critique

of legal practice I believe, 28 and question begging in terms of our discussion here, but nevertheless one of the best books on legal (and professional) ethics I have read-the author notes the pedagogical problem this
fleeing to the core creates for professional development, but he misses the
point. He says that because of the wide spread impression that lawyers
act in violation of ordinary morals, we must offer to students not the typical arguments about the merits or lack of merits of this impression, nor
should we offer abstract social justifications for the practice, but instead
present the practice to our students in the "first person register"29 as part
of a "life that a person may honorably pursue."3 0 The practice he has in
mind is unsurprising. It is an "authoritatively insular" role capable of
sustaining idiosyncratic first personal moral ambitions. In other words,
words more typically used for this, it must in fact be a practice in the
MacIntyrian sense of offering its own set of virtues as an internal good.31
The students he has in mind to whom this practice is being offered are
people, he says, for whom ethics is a matter of the "self-assertion that
25. See Cooper-White, supranote 9, at 141.
26. "There is no core, no prior self-presence for us to plumb. Subjectivity exists caught
up in a process of becoming in which everything is at issue." WALTER A. DAVIS, INWARDNESS
AND EXISTENCE: SUBJECTIVITY IN/AND HEGEL, HEIDEGGER, MARX, AND FREUD 109 (2011).

This book is a great treasure.
27. DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A
DEMOCRATIC AGE (2008).

28. See Jack L. Sammons, 'Cheater!. The Central Moral Admonition of Legal Ethics,
Games, Lusory Attitudes, InternalPerspectives, and Justice, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 273 (2003).
29. MARKOVITS, supra note 27, at 10.
30. Id.
31. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984).
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dominates ordinary morality." 32 What he fears is that these students are
already too cosmopolitan to accept the moral authority of a practice if the
morals of the practice are idiosyncratic. And later on he worries that the
practice itself is or will become similarly too cosmopolitan to offer this
moral authority at all. 3 At which point, we can say, it would cease to be
a practice.
As you can see, however, this description of students is but yet another
way to say that they are committed to a core self, for "cosmopolitan" in
our times and culture typically means that you have a self you can turn
to which is freed from all social roles, all social ties, and is "impartial," as
cosmopolitanism requires, because it recognizes few of the social relationship that would call this impartiality into question.
Ironically, what Markovits offers to these students to address their
"resentment at betraying their [own] integrity" 34 is Keats's "negative capabilities" 35-for lawyers this means fidelity to client not just as partisanship but with a deference that permits clients to speak through youas a central virtue of the practice of law which can make a life within the
practice of law a life worth living.36 I think he is completely right about
the importance and value of this virtue, and wish that he would have
taken the analogy to poets further, but notice that "negative capabilities"
is precisely the sort of decentering of the self, moving it away from an
illusory core, that Josh led us to and is the hallmark of postmodernist
and posthumanist thinking. It requires exactly the sort of understanding
of our existence as selves that Markovits' students should reject if they
are to be "true to themselves" as he described them. In essence, what he
has missed is that what he thinks of as his students' moral concerns are
better described, as we have said, as "existential anxieties" about the
meaning of their existence as selves.3 7 Their morals are morals of "selfassertion" because they seek to impose themselves on the world, not so
much through hubris, although there is that for some, but as a matter of
being insecure in who they are to become. But, if this is true, then it just
raises our questions about the sort of self the practice is asking them to
become, because it must ask this if they are to become the sort of person
the practice requires, and our questions about how they might be moved
in this direction despite their existential anxieties about it. If Markovits'
project is to have real practical value, this is where he must start.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

MARKOVITS, supra note 27, at 5.
Id. at 12, 225.
Id. at 9.
1 THE LETTERS OF JOHN KEATS 193-94 (Hyder Edward Rollins ed. 1958).
Id. at 93-99.
See id.
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Notice as well that for Markovits life within this "authoritatively insular" role can be justified with reference to the virtues offered. Acquiring
these virtues-remember that, simply put, he is offering these as a bulwark against a dominant sense within the culture that being a lawyer is
not a morally good thing to be-is justified primarily by the political benefit they offer the community.38 To see their value, then, he shifts the
argument to a political context.39 Now I have no objection to this, and
justifications of the practice have been argued in this form often before,
but again it misses the students' concerns by making these concerns primarily moral ones. Without an examination of the self, you cannot simply
say to them, even as an appealing argument in the "first person register":
"Abandon now who you are in your core because, if you do, you will help
your community and others in your new role." The problem they are facing, as I've described it, is again one about the self they are becoming, a
changed sense of self which is prior to whatever politicalor (even)40 moral
good one may do, to which this is no real answer. What the practice must
offer to them, I believe, is a sense of self which is not something which
works well within an "authoritativelyinsular"practiceand is sociallyjustified, but one offering a form of authenticity of self in all that they may
do-a complete way of life.4 ' So in addition to an appealing argument of
redescription of the role, the argument Markovits should be offering is
the argument that the way in which the practice will change who you are
is a good way because it is a more authentic way to live in our postmodern
times and culture. 42 Although I do not develop this argument fully here
38. MARKOVITS, supra note 27, at 170-211.
39. Id. at 171.
40. This is a controversial thing to say given that many philosophers see the self as
formed inseparably in some relationship to some form of the good, and not at all prior to it,
but I want to stick with what I say here because, for the way in which almost all of those
writing about the professions use the term "moral," this isn't true. For each version of this
use of "morals," there are, I believe, necessary assumptions being made about the self of
the agent and not just assumptions of some form of a unity and a consistency. If you think
about the rather complex understandings of the nature of the self assumed in virtue ethics
or moral intuitionism, for example, I think this becomes clear. And, in any event, I would
insist that students who are becoming professionals experience an existential anxiety about
who they are which is not itself experienced as a moral anxiety but as something more basic
-a matter of "self' preservation if you will: to be or not to be. I don't think this should be
too controversial even though so many in the academy convert this anxiety to moral terms.
41. I promised others I would include this: half jokingly at the Symposium I said that
what I wanted students to understand is that I am trying to shift thinking about practices
away from the good and towards the cool because in our culture the cool is ontologically
prior to the good.
42. I want to be clear that I am certainly not denying that there are internal goods of
practices that are themselves reasons for being in it, reasons for being good at it, and reasons for not cheating. I am also not denying that these internal goods can have appealing
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-and offer only a few examples and more than a few polemical claims
about it-this is at the heart of what I wish to say.
It is the partisanship of practices which creates, as I think you would
expect, the moral issues Markovits wants addressed in the way he described. For it is their partisanship which both defines and challenges
our practices. As an initial step towards understanding partisanship as
a matter not of abstract morals but of meaning, our practices require, as
many others have said in many other contexts, that you first become a
stranger to yourself in order to recognize the other you will serve as not
a stranger. In this process, it is assumed, paraphrasing Niebuhr, 43 that
you will find that the shortest way to yourself within a practice is through
the other, 44 and in doing so come to recognize your own co-dependent coexistence, the multiplicity of the "singular plural" that is you. In this
recognition there is a path not just towards a professional life worthy of
commitment because of the good it does-a life within the practice-but
one towards a more authentic complete way of life in our times and culture.
If we took Markovits' analogy to poets more seriously, for another example, we could say that to become his good poet with "negative capability," that is, taking this on as a way of being professional, means you
must no longer think of yourself as unique because you have a unique set
of beliefs, desires, moods, and emotions, for none of these is unique to you
nor are they "yours." This is a romantic fiction and the self expressive
poetry which arises from it is almost always dreadful.4 5Your desires, for
example, are never simply your own in the sense that you can control
them. Your desires are always in some measure experienced as somehow
prior to and beyond you; they come upon you, in other words. We do not
say to ourselves: "I am going to desire thus and such or so and so." Instead
external justifications although I have never made this argument myself. While this can be
true, it is not the reason you seek the internal goods of your practices, and the reasons you
do return us to questions of meaning found within a sense of self the which practice requires
of you for its own excellences. It is the potential authenticity of this sense of self as a way
of life which links our practices to our lives. (And not, as MacIntyre argued, our practices
fitting, or not, within the narrative unity of human life as a quest.) MACINTYRE, supra note
27, at 216. For a helpful discussion of this, and a good challenge for MacIntyre, see Lia
Mela, MacIntyre on PersonalIdentity, 3(1) PUBLIC REASON 110-13 (2011).
43. NIEBUHR, supra note 10, at 71.
44. "[T]he shortest route to the self is through the other; the self only returns to itself
after numerous hermeneutical detours through the embodied language of others, to find
itself enlarged and enriched by the journey." Wentzel van Huyssteen & Erik P. Wiebe, Introduction, in IN SEARCH OF SELF, supranote 7, at 6.
45. More than dreadful: Art is fundamentally opposed to this form of egoistic expression. See ROWAN WILLIAMS, GRACE AND NECESSITY: REFLECTIONS ON ART AND LOVE 15-31

(2005). Williams is echoing Jacque Maritain in this.
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our desires are always already there before we think of them. The same
is true of our moods, emotions, and, in fact, those feelings that may be
most important to you in living your life well-a sense of being honorable,
of being trustworthy, of being loved, or feelings of remorse or shame, or
the personal disturbances prompted by the needs of justice and truthare not within your control nor do they come from you. In this, that which
seems most your own is not your own. Not to understand this, as Rowan
Williams argued, is to "defin[e] 'real' selfhood out of both time and conversation[s]." 46 Thus, in this as well, the practices ask that their initiates
first become strangers to themselves in order to discover who they are in
others (and, as we said before, for those others to not be strangers).
As we can begin to see from these two small examples, 47 practices seek
to mature 48 their initiates towards a self formed in opposition to the core
self, the one Markovits described his students as having, 49 the one dominant in our culture as he said,50 and it is a self for our times and our
culture. For each practice I believe-perhaps there are exceptions but
those exceptions call into question what we mean by the word "practice"
-necessarily assumes a form of self, the one we learned from Josh, that
is not fixed, always already multiple, always already co-existent, always
already co-dependent, always already contingent, always already within
a process of constant change, and always already complex and enigmatic
-a self which must forever remain a mystery to itself-not as a mystery
to be solved but because being a mystery is its nature. Each practice requires for its own excellences that its practitioners mature into a social
world of others upon whom their own existence as selves depends. It asks

46.

ROWAN WILLIAMS, LOST ICONS: REFLECTIONS ON CULTURAL BEREAVEMENT 111

(2000). Williams goes on in words much needed in our times: "IfI am not capable of understanding this, I shall see myself as a bundle of 'natural' phenomena-instincts, desires,
affinities-not open to critique, not capable of being thought through or articulated in recognizable speech. In political terms, this is the seedbed of fascism and violent xenophobia."
Id. (emphasis added).
47. I have chosen these two because they seem central to me, and clearest in their
connection to a "decentering" of self, infra Part II. There were many to choose from. For
example, almost all of those speaking at the Symposium described tolerance of ambiguity
as a requirement of their professional practices. But ask yourself then what is the form of
self which lends itself best to this form of tolerance and is prior to this way of being? For a
more complex one, almost everyone mentioned trustworthiness as the same. But, and this
is a much harder question but I think it leads in the same direction, what is the form of self
which lends itself best to becoming trustworthy? It is certainly not a core self into which
one can flee for a safe harbor from personal responsibility for one's actions.
48. This is not the say, of course, the subtle forces within practices moving practitioners
in this direction are always successful or even always felt.
49. IIARKOVITS, supra note 27.
50. Id.
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each of its practitioners, in other words, to know yourself, makes a claim
about what this means, and this claim is always about a decentering of
self.
But what can we do about this? How are we to give to our students the
courage needed to deny who they are at their core, as it might feel to
them, in the hope of living authentically within a practice and beyond
it?51 How can we give to them the courage necessary to give up a present
personal security, however false it may be, in the vague hope of an implicitly promised later authenticity? 52 Reassurance is needed here, to be

51. Larry Golemon, Executive Director of the Washington Theological Consortium,
mentioned at the workshop following the Symposium that there should be a lamenting of
the loss of a prior self as there is in seminary. For doctors, for example, this would be a sad
farewell to their former "coat" when they don the white one.
52. The "professional identity" movement in legal education-the movement which
prompted this Symposium-has generated quite a lot of classroom exercises in self-reflection about becoming professionals. These exercises do make it clear to students that they
are becoming something different, but, I fear, almost everything else about many of them
is counter-productive to anything called a "professional identity." This is true because the
not-too-subtle implicit message of these exercises is that what you are becoming as a law
student is a bad thing. Acquiring a "professional identity" is imagined in these exercises as
something to be avoided primarily because it represents a challenge to a "personal" morality
arising from a "personal" identity, and secondarily because "professional identity" means
playing a more formal role in society, e.g., having to wear a suit and tie, and the female
equivalent of this dress, and speak and act in certain accepted ways which are then imagined as ways you did not really choose for yourself so they must be false. How should we
expect students to react to this message? They know they cannot (nor should they) impose
themselves upon the practice, change its necessary morality, or fully neglect its social
norms, so, instead, they retreat into a core self away from any professional identity, a self
in which they can avoid personal responsibility for who they are and what they do as lawyers. This is, as I think you can see, an invitation to an inauthentic, hypocritical, and disingenuous way of being-the opposite of what the movement is attempting to do. It is also
something destructive of the practice itself because it takes from it the sort of personal
commitment-fully human commitment-it requires of its practitioners in order for the
practice to be a moral one. For me, and I hope for others, what is also terribly upsetting
about this is that the "personal morality" claims offered in support of this retreat are overly
simplistic and usually wrong. There is no real tension between what we might call ordinary
morality and the morality of the practice of law unless you believe that justice, fairness,
and meaningful participation in the resolution of social disputes are irrelevant to ordinary
morality, or, more socially, that the self-defining of the community through the legal conversation, the preservation of the language of that conversation such that it remains meaningful, and the preservation of social trust in this conversation and its outcomes are also of
no moral import. In fact, in its social and most comprehensive version, ordinary morality
quite clearly requires the morals of legal practice on its own terms. There is of course ambiguity, complexity, uncertainty, and tragedy in the morality of the practice as there is in
ordinary morality, but the practice tends to shapes its practitioners towards a tolerance of
ambiguity, complexity, and uncertainty, and towards the practical wisdom needed to address the morally tragic. And, of great importance in this context, it shapes its practitioners
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sure, and yet if what we offer as an authentic way of existing as a self is
the self Josh has described for us, it is difficult to be reassuring because
this is the self as a task, an uncertain one at that, as it was for Josh
during most of his life, rather than a thing. It is a task at the edge of
meaning (which is also the edge of self) and so a fragile, contingent, and
conditional thing.5 3 The challenge to us is thus clear and it is, I believe,
the challenge which faces us in the classroom every single day.
There are further problems, problems which haunt all understandings
of a decentered self and for which numerous solutions have been offered.
Surely, in the reality of our multiplicity and our ever changing selves
there is a very strong need for a sense of unity and continuity, but where
are we to find these if the self is decentered? And, if this self is an ongoing
task, as we have said, what sort of task is this and what is it that one is
trying to accomplish in performing it? What is its process and where is it
headed? What is the teleology of this ever changing, multitudinous self'?
III. THE NARRATIVE SELF

Among the numerous solutions offered to the problem of unity and
continuity there in spades in a postmodern sense of self, one is a theory

towards postponing moral judgment, sensitivity to the need to uncover all the relevant factual and moral complexities, and the moral imagination consideration of all those morally
affected requires. The personal morality being offered by those in the movement as an argument against professional identity tends away from all of these virtues for its own selfconfirmation. Let me give you just one example which arose at the Symposium. One speaker
offered what the speaker described as a moral dilemma for lawyers. It involved a prosecutor
who violated his obligation to do justice-quite different from winning and losing for prosecutors-by hubristically and non-publicly imposing his own moral judgment upon everyone else including the community in which he lived, and did so in such a way that no one
aware of what he had done would have trusted the outcome of the criminal case he tried.
The speaker suggested, and later made clear to me, that the speaker thought this prosecutor a moral hero. Why? The real reason is that the speaker agreed with the outcome of the
case for the defendant-nothing else. This speaker is a brilliant, thoughtful, well known
academic in a non-legal field, but what the speaker had done was take a complex, factually
sensitive, moral issue and presented it in four or five sentences pre-loaded for a knee jerk
reaction well suited to the speaker's own. To get law students to imagine themselves honestly within this situation, to carefully consider all those "others" left out of those four or
five sentences, and to approach the issue as a thoughtful lawyer might, would have required
twenty or thirty pages of description, hours of good conversation, and all those virtues the
practice of law offers.
53. Consider: "[i]nwardness is not a substance with some sort of fixed nature one can
discover through the less exacting exercises of traditional reflection. From its inception,
reflection, if existential, is not a Kantian or Cartesian process with fixed a priori guidelines
and rational limits, but an opening up of holes in one's being, gaps in one's experience,
questions of preemptory force which lack any apparent answer." DAVIS, supra note 26, at
108.
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developed in great philosophical detail by Paul Ricoeur5 4 and Charles
Taylor,5 5 but also well developed by many others from many different
disciplines such that "the idea . . . . has become increasingly conspicuous
56
in all areas of the human sciences, including psychology." This is the

theory of the narrative self (a theory closely related to the "dialogical
self," another way of approaching our issue, which I will not discuss here
to get this to an acceptable size) and in it is the process of narrating one's
life story-constantly relating the histories of multiple discrete selves to
each other in a single story-which produces a sense of unity and continuity and thus of agency. For Taylor, this is a return to the subject, but
not to subjectivism which he counters with a renewed sense of socially
embedded authenticity in which our identity and our authenticity is nec57
essarily linked to a good experienced within each narrative. For Ricoeur, since any narrative emerges from memory and our memories are so
unreliable-as much a product of imagination as of stored and then retrieved data-we turn to others of necessity to become our narrative
selves. 5 8 His narrative theory, as developed by others, offers a way of
finding unity and continuity amidst a multiplicity which includes not just
a multiplicity of selves but also the multiple ways that we can experience
each of these selves at any given moment and in relation to any given
experience. 59 This form of narrative theory then is not a return to the
subject at all, but, in a sense, to narrative itself and thus to language and
thus to interpretation and thus to hermeneutics. In fact, you will not find
in the best of narrative theories, even those like Taylor who do return us
to the subject, any idea of a simple, subjective, singular, narrating self
who is somehow capable of narrating his or her own life. None believe
that one can be a sole author of one's own life. If this were true, narrative

54. PAUL RICOEUR, 3 TIME AND NARRATIVE (Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer
trans. 1990) (1988); PAUL RICOEUR, ONESELF AS ANOTHER (Kathleen Blamey trans., 1995)
(1992).
55. TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supranote 22. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, THE
ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY (1991).
56. Turner, supranote 23, at 128.
57. See generally TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY, supra note 55, and TAYLOR,
SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 22, at 42-52. For an excellent and very clear discussion
of Taylor's sense of the self, see BRAMAN, MEANING AND AUTHENTICITY, supra note 3.
58. RICOEUR, ONESELF AS ANOTHER, supra note 54, at 113-68. "Ricoeur claims then
that memory is the 'gateway to the self and to personal identity, and since there is always
a narrative component to memory, our remembering always implies narrative experience.
However, since memory is so directly associated with imagination, our recollections of our
own past are liable to distorts, and, by implication, our personal identities are fragile."
Wentzel van Huyssteen & Wiebe, supra note 7, at 4-5.
59. See Turner, supra note 23, at 125-46; see also Cooper-White, supra note 9, at 14162.
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theory would have just replicated in a different register the problem of
the core self. (And all that would matter then would be the narrative
choices this self made and, since that is all that matters, nothing would
really matter.) Instead, for much of narrative theory the self is a complex
narrative process in which the story of the self is told from the perspective
of various "I" positions none of which remains dominant within some hierarchy of selves, for any hierarchy one may sense at times is situational
and contingent. In other words, for these versions of narrative theory
there are various experiences of multiple selves with "each one functioning as interacting characters in a story."6 0 It is this story, not the "I's"
which write it, which then offers an existential self, the self of our being,
the self, we can now say with Josh, which continues whenever our name
is spoken.
To put this theory in simpler terms, the unity and consistency we must
seek for any self is provided not by a core singular self, but by narrative
itself. But how can this be? How can something like narrative that is not
'"you" in ordinary parlance, for the narratives of our lives seem in some
ways external to those lives in a way a core self could not, be "you"? How
can something you do not fully choose, for, once again, it is very clear that
you cannot fully choose your own narrative, become something which; in
a very real sense, chooses you in such a personal way as to be who you
are?
Notice with me now that the difficulty we have in thinking about the
self-a difficulty there in the very language I have been using-is primarily the result of the nature of our self-reflection, a reflection in which
the self is both the experiencing subject-the one reflecting-and the object experienced-the one reflected upon-an endlessly circular process
which also always circles back upon itself. Yet, as others have said, we
are most ourselves, in the sense of most fully experiencing our existence
as selves, when we question our selves in this way. 61 In other words, in
our most intense experiences of self the subject/object distinction almost
vanishes, and, in doing so, calls our thinking only in those terms, as we
do most of the time, into question in a very personal way. Because the
self is both subject and object to us in this way, its ontological status
seems in doubt as does, for example, the ontological status of a work of
art-a melody, a painting, a poem-and for very similar reasons. It is
perhaps clearest in these moments of careful self-reflection that the self
is, and must be, a cultural construct, an emergent one which does not
obey the ordinary laws of causality. But despite being a cultural construct no one could doubt the self s reality-as real as a bridge we might
60.
61.

Zock, supra note 19, at 172; see also Turner, supra note 23, at 126-32.
See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 26, at 107.
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say-without suffering not only pain of inconsistency but also complete
incoherence. If there is to be any understanding of a decentered self to
match our experience of it, I think it must be one which more clearly
reflects this form of reality in which there is this collapsing of subject and
object. (Notice that if you found Josh's conception of a second death appealing and persuasive you have already accepted this separate reality
for this is the ontology of that idea.)
If this is true, then the way in which narrative theory of the self reflects this-its sense of unity and continuity and thus agency-comes not
from the subject but emerges from the ontological reality lying in between
subject and object as a cultural construct. More simply put, we have trouble understanding narrative agency-the "how could this be you" questions above-because we continue to view agency as subjective rather
than emergent out of our experiences. Thus, still more simply, there really is a "me" within the developing narrative of my life, and it as unified
and as consistent as agency requires, but it is not purely subjective and,
instead, is there, really there, within the experiences that constitute the
narrative, experiences which themselves cannot be described only in regards to a subject.
Now these are deep waters obviously, and we are only sailing lightly
on their surface, but, nevertheless, I think we can see that the sense of
agency that narrative theory can provide in this way better reflects our
experiences of our existence as selves when those experiences are carefully considered, especially when we realize that the reflection required
for this careful consideration "isn't a private or occasional act, a room
divorced from experience that we enter from time to time, but a constant
self-interrogation that is lived out immediately in the moods and attitudes we take up toward our projects. In this way, reflection is constant
with experience." 62 If, as we have seen, practices move us towards the
sort of decentered self we have been describing, the one we learned from
Josh, they move us in the direction of this form of agency as well, and,
again, it is towards a more truthful, more authentic, way of being. One
simple way of saying what the difference is, and a nice nutshell summary
of what is most important in this, is that this conception of the self encourages us not to impose our imagined selves upon the world, but for

62. "All intentional activities entail some intending of oneself and include an implicit
reference to the potential self-consciousness that acts as their interrogation. The burden of
existence is not just that we can't get away from ourselves, but that we are always, even in
flight, living out that fact. Reflection isn't a private or occasional act, a room divorced from
experience that we enter from time to time, but a constant . . . self-interrogation that is
lived out immediately in the moods and attitudes we take up toward our projects. In this
way, reflection is constant with experience." DAVIS, supra note 26, at 110-11.

2017]

THE ART OF SELF

757

our selves in their reality to be disclosed to us and, in being so, permitting
us to live more truthfully, more authentically.
Thus the narrative self is a decentered self-similar to Keats's negative capabilities but this time directed towards oneself-that is, as we
said, the hallmark of post-modern and post-humanist thinking, and yet
it remains adequate for our sense of unity and continuity and thus
agency. There is, however, a remaining problem. How can a narrative
provide a sense of direction, a "teleology" as we termed this earlier? 63 This
is not at all clear other than through the forces of narratives taking on a
life of their own (as they sometimes do). Yet surely the sense of a core self
is dominant within our culture, and in our students as Markovits said,64
because, at least in part, it seems to provide for us this sense of direction.
There is something or someone we already are, this core self says to us,
that we are supposed to become.6 5 And, in fact, it always seems as if this
is how most of us make our most crucial life decisions. Yet, while the core
self is more than sufficient to provide this teleology, it provides it, as we
have seen, only at the great cost of an inevitable inauthenticity.
A teleology of self does seem essential, however. If our understanding
of self is to be as narrative, we have to ask what might provide this sense
of direction. Is there something in narrative offering authoritative guidance for changes we might make in our lives, changes in who we are and
who we are becoming, and if so, what is the form of authority it has over
us and is it authentic? Without some clearer sense of this, narrative theory seems almost as inadequate to capture fully our experience of our
existence as selves as the core self does.
Rather than belaboring what others have said about this, for each version of a narrative theory of self may have resources available to it that
it can draw upon to answer this challenge, some perhaps better than others, let me say simply that most answers to this question I have read
seem inadequate. Most answers, it seems to me, retain in sometimes subtle ways the subject/object distinction which, in large measure, as we saw
before, creates the problem they are all trying to address, and in doing so
66
these answers also distort our experience of self.

63. Supra Part III.
64. Supra Part II.
65. Consider: "One reflects [upon a core self] up to the point where reflection discovers
the substantiality or stability of something that is already there . . . and thus puts an end
to reflection. Reflection, so conceived, has strict limits because its goal is cessation in the
discovery (and contemplation) of a substantialized being." DAVIS, supra note 26, at 108.
66. You will find others troubled in the same way in Anna Stetsenko & Igor M.
Arievitch, The Self in Cultural-HistoricalActivity Theory Reclaiming the Unity of Social
and Individual Dimensionsof Human Development, 14(4) THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 475-503
(2003), but without the ontological connection I try to make here.
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Instead of these, to answer the challenge we need something permitting us to think our way into the circle of thought about subject and object
the self offers to us with its puzzling ontology. Perhaps we can do this, as
I will try to do here, by taking certain elements from narrative theory
and building upon those. What I have in mind specifically are the concepts of the "author" and the "narrative". At this point, however, I would
like to drop the thought that the self is a creation of prose, as narrative
theories of the self suggest-for it seems more than that-and instead of
author and narrative generalize to speak of artists of the self and, as in
the title of this talk, the art of the self.
But what then, you may be asking yourself this time, does the practice
of art have to do with becoming a professional? In trying to answer this I
will turn once again to Josh. This time not just to something he said, but
to something about the way he lived.
IV. THE ART OF SELF
When he was nineteen Josh committed two very brutal murders-one
for which he was arrested and convicted; another, unknown to the police
at the time of his arrest, he voluntarily disclosed. Others would argue
that Josh had been abandoned and was under the influence of drugs and
the pernicious influence of older men who corrupted who he really was: a
good kid. But Josh would have none of this. He accepted responsibility
for what he had done almost as soon as he did it. Contrast this young
67
murderer now with the person Josh became on death row. Amy Dunn,

the person you will remember who provided our "two deaths" quote, has
spoken and written about Josh several times since his execution-at the
Masses and memorial services held for him, online in several formats,
and in a newspaper article she wrote about what she learned from him.
Each time, at some point after talking about the uplifting influence towards the good he had on all those gathered around him, she would say:
"But he was not a saint"-a caution to others and perhaps to herself because such a reminder was needed for those who came to know him: the
death penalty social workers, death penalty lawyers, law students,
priests, deacons (including one who became a priest in part because of
67. Contrast this as well with the way in which Josh faced his death. This, once again
from Amy Dunn: "[s]adly, he did make terrible choices as a young man that would ultimately put him on that table with a lethal dose of poison pumping into his body on that
terrible night. Joshua certainly would not have chosen to die that way, who would? But he
managed to choose his state of being as he departed this earth. He chose grace over fear, he
chose love over hate, he chose forgiveness over anger, he chose humor over sadness, and he
chose gratitude over self pity." Amy Dunn, Lessons I Learned from a Man on Death Row,
THE TELEGRAPH, July 11, 2016, http://www.macon.com/opinion/readers-opinion/article
88910887.html.
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his experience with Josh), parishioners, prosecutors, other death row inmates, family, friends, and on and on. Consider but one example: Brandon Veasey, one of the Mercer law students who worked on his hearings,
and now a practicing attorney at Troutman Sanders in Atlanta, told the
following story a day after Josh's execution:
I went to visit Joshua a few weeks ago when I heard that he had
been issued a death warrant and his execution date had been set. It
had been a while since I had last seen him. I was nervous, afraid, and
angry. I had nothing to say, I was at a loss for words. So I prayed for
God to give me the words I needed to comfort my friend. I immediately
felt called to read the book of Joshua. I had never read Joshua. It did
not take long for me to find what God wanted me to share with Josh.
Joshua 1:9 reads: 'Have I not commanded you? Be strong and courageous. Do not be afraid; do not be discouraged, for the Lord your God
will be with you wherever you go.' At the time, I thought this is what
God wanted me to share with Josh so I read the verse to him. He looked
me in the eyes, put his hand on my shoulder and said: 'I got this
brother, I love you.' Then we prayed together. Last night he had the
same exact peace about him that I know only comes from his faith in
God. Josh had one more lesson to teach me through all of this, victory
and glory will always be God's. God didn't use me to teach Joshua that
verse, he used Joshua to teach it to me. A lesson I will hold in my heart
forever.68
If we are thinking about becoming, about changes of self, about a unity
and consistency of self which gives agency in spite of these changes, and
most particularly about a "teleology of self," we have something to learn
from Josh for whom these questions were for most of his life not armchair
matters, but a daily preoccupation with the meaning of his existence as
a self. Perhaps then Josh can be a reliable resource for us once again.
What I want to suggest in what follows is that Josh's art-his painting
specifically (although this was not his only art)-some of which were recently displayed in a gallery, others framed and hung in homes and offices, and many of which you can find online-offered to him and offers
to us a way of understanding the teleology of the self the practice asks
our students to become and a way of understanding why it is a more au69
thentic way of being.
68. Brandon Veasey, FACEBOOK (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/brandon.ve
asey.73?fref-ts (published with permission).
69. It is true that what Josh became was due in large measure to the influence of some
very good and very supportive people (including very thoughtful fellow travelers on death
row). But while this is true, it doesn't address for us the question of the authenticity of the
changes of self that happened to him. Based on my own very limited work on death penalty
cases, it appears to me to be very easy and certainly very understandable to be inauthentic
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I think it is fair to say that being an artist was central to Josh's sense
of self. As Amy Dunn reports, "When the prison took away his sparse
collection of art materials, he would improvise by creating paint from
common items found in the prison and utilized cardboard boxes and paper bags as his canvas."70 But I think as well that perhaps being an artist

was how Josh made sense of his self. In yet another conversation Amy
had with Josh, he told her that "He could look at a blank piece of paper
and see the image that it held; all he had to do was bring it to life."7 1

This seemingly strange experience is a very common one for good artists. As I have argued in the past, this sense of things-painting, sculptures, poems, songs, characters, films, symphonic themes, designs, and
on and on-somehow emerging from the materials of one's art is there at
the origin of art and the origin of art is our origin as well. 72 It is, in other

words, how we became human: the way in which, in the terms used here
prompted by Josh, the unique "access" each of us offers first arose. 73 Rather than returning to that here, however, notice with me that the experience of something emerging from the materials of one's art-think perhaps of Michelangelo bringing forth his David-is, as the self is,
ontologically problematic. The work of art which results comes from the
artist and yet does not come from the artist. It is neither the product of a
subjective intent nor of an objective reality, and the work reflects this,

on death row, but, as Sarah Gerwig-Moore, Josh's attorney, said in the moving and widely
published obituary she wrote for Josh: "He was not a fake." Josh Bishop Obituary, THE
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 10, 2016, http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/macon/obituary.aspx?n=joshbishop&pid=179568761&; see also Joe Kovacs, Jr. Condemn Man's Obituary Give Rare
Glimpse of Humanity on Georgia Death Row, THE TELEGRAPH, Apr. 16, 2016,
http://www.macon.com/news/locallarticle72267012.html. And it is also true, as many said
of Josh, that he was basically a "good kid" led astray, but, as I said in the text above, Josh
never accepted that version of the events. As we all know, there are a very large number of
"basically good kids" who, if they do not continue to do horrible things, nevertheless never
live up to this claim made about them. So, again, the questions remain, and to try to answer
them puts us back into our questions about the self. Finally, Josh began his art at about
the same time he was becoming a Catholic. It is surely his Catholicism which in large measure we see reflected in the grace he displayed as he approached his death and, often enough,
his Catholicism we also see reflected in his painting. This, however, is not at all in tension
with the claim that Josh's art was central to his sense of self, nor, according to Sarah
Gerwig-Moore, would he have seen it as such. Conversation with Sarah Gerwig-Moore on
October 9, 2016. As discussed below, Josh's experience with Catholicism became part of the
materials out of which his art could make sense of his self, his way of being.
70. Dunn, Lessons I Learned from a Man on Death Row, supra note 67.
71. Id.
72. Jack L. Sammons, Can Law Be Art?, 66 MERCER L. REV. 527 (2014).
73. Id.
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for it lives, as the self does, in the ontologically puzzling land between the
two. 74

The good painter's experience of painting reflects this ontology: each
stroke is measured against that which the painting seems to want to bewas meant to become-and the good painter takes this pushing back of
the materials against his or her intentions for the painting very seriously.
In a sense, this "pushing back" seems a form of truth7 5 about the painting
and has that authority for the painter-as it does for the poet, the novelist, the composer, the guitar maker, the stone and brick mason, the wood
carver, and any other good artist working carefully, thoughtfully, attentively, respectfully, and humbly with the materials of his or her particular practice of art. Each painting, it seems, has its own teleology, suggesting to the painter the fittingness of each color, each line, each brush
stroke, and suggesting that some of these are not only necessary, but "inevitable"7 6 for the painting to be what it was meant to become.
Here then is a way towards understanding both a teleology within the
decentered self we have described and the way in which agency can
emerge from experience as we saw in the narrative self. Here then, as
well, is potential guidance for our students: a way of understanding the
way in which they are to acquire a more authentic self in becoming professional. But first let us put this back in terms of Josh's life. As Amy put
it, "So much of Joshua's life was about forgiveness-whether he was asking for forgiveness from the people he hurt, or struggling to forgive those
who hurt him. It's easy to give into anger over what happened to him, but
Josh wants us to forgive." 77 But why? Because, Amy said, drawing on
Josh's artistic understanding of his own life in an expression painters
will recognize: "You need the dark in order to show the light." 78
What his art had given to Josh was this sense of direction, this teleology there for a clearly co-dependent co-existent, multiple, ever changing,
self. Perhaps then what we should be assisting our students in doing is
to become artists in an art of self as Josh did. Perhaps they too can approach the materials of their practices, including within those "materials" their own experiences, as the materials of an art out of which

74. See generally Jack L. Sammons, The Law's Melody, in LEGAL AFFINITIES:
EXPLORATIONS IN THE LEGAL FORM OF THOUGHT 79 (Patrick McKinley Brennan, H. Jeffer-

son Powell & Jack L. Sammons eds., 2013).
75. This is truth as aletheia or "uncovering." For my own attempt at a description, see
Sammons, Can Law Be Art?, supra note 72, at 541 n.43.
76. See Linda Berger & Jack Sammons, The Law's Mystery, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD.
1 (2013).
77. Dunn, Eulogy for Joshua Bishop, supranote 4.
78. Id.
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emerges for each one uniquely a teleology of self-a self they can experience as who they were meant to become. Perhaps they will find that in
approaching their work with the attitude of an artist that this truth
about who I am meant to be is a radical intimacy, something closer than
I am to myself.79 And, in this, understand the authenticity of the life the
practice can offer to them. Thus we now have a simple way of understanding what we said before: that the difference with the core self most important in this is that we offer a conception of the self encouraging us not
to impose our imagined selves upon the world, but for our selves, in their
reality, to be disclosed to us, and, in being disclosed, permitting us to live
more truthfully, more authentically. Who you are and are to become, and
the meaning you seek in this, this says, will disclose itself to you through
the materials and experiences of your life as a professional when you approach these with the attitude of an artist.80 As odd as this may sound
and as difficult as it may be to accept, I want to insist that this is exactly
how the best of professionals-lawyers, judges, doctors, nurses, priests,
psychologists, teachers, architects, and others-experience themselves
as the professionals they are.
V. TEACHING TOWARD THE ART OF SELF
But how can we, as one person put this, "[1]ure the self into the very
emergence of self in and among its others"?81 And what is the "attitude
of an artist"? And how might we foster this attitude in our students?
There are many ways of approaching these questions, I think, and I will,
in a moment, offer a few specific thoughts, but essentially there are two
things I want to suggest. The first is that the self of the student as a
professional emerges only when the student finds herself within the full
world of her practice. Immersion within this world should begin at the
very beginning of their professional education. The second is related to
this. It is that the student must be led, step-by-step, to a love of, indeed
a reverence for, the materials and experiences of this world. All that a
student learns in preparation for a practice should be taught, I think,
with these two objectives also in mind. (I need to say immediately that to
come to love the materials of one's art is not to accept the art without
criticism or challenge; it is quite the opposite. No artists loved the materials of their art more than, for example, Beethoven, Kandinsky, Sch6enberg, and yet each in his own way challenged his art in essential ways.)
79. See Keller, supra note 7.
80. As Rowan Williams put this: "You have to find what you must obey, artistically;
and finding it is finding that which exists in relation to more than your [own] will and
purpose." WILLIAMS, GRACE AND NECESSITY, supra note 45, at 147.
81. Keller, supra note 7, at 303.
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To get you started exploring this in your own teaching, let me give an
example or two of how this might be taught. Our students' selves cannot
be "lured" to emergence among their others within a practice if those
"others" are not present for them, at least conceptually. Too often, especially at the beginning of our students' education when they first start
examining who they are in terms of the practice, rather than placing our
students conceptually within a relational, contextual, and embodied
practice, we instead remove all the "others" with whom they will eventually work to focus upon abstracted knowledge and skills. To do this is not
only to encourage these students not to consider how their understanding
of who they are will be changed by the practice-it is to take from them
the materials from which "who they are" can emerge-it is an encouragement to them to approach the practice from a core self, entirely removed
from the practice, and there to be imposed upon it. Instead of this, and
using legal education as my example, from the moment they arrive at law
school everything taught to our students should be taught, as it arises in
almost all of its particularities, within the world of the practice, at least
conceptually. This is not to say, abandon the case method. It is to say, in
teaching cases all the relationships which give meaning to those cases,
and meaning to those whose work they are, should be present in the
classroom: the clients clearly, but also the opposing attorneys, the trial
judge, the jury, the community, and, again clearly, the appellate judge
who wrote it. Using this last to further our example, reading the opinion
itself should be an exercise, at least in part, in examining who this judge
is in his relationship to his readers, to the parties, and to the community.
Law professors of my generation had the great advantage of having
James Boyd White 82 as our exemplar for knowing how to ask: what form
of authority is created in the opinion, that is, how does the judge have
the right to say what he or she does? What judicial character has the
judge created in the opinion? What kind of ideal reader is the judge trying
to create through the opinion? What kind of community does the judge
establish with the readers? What kind of conversation does it create?
Most especially, what kind of arguments does it encourage as a way of
continuing, keeping the issue open? As you can see, these questions put
the inquiry imaginatively within the "world" of the opinion, and they do
so in a manner in which our students can not only bring this "world" imaginatively to life before their vision, but also displace themselves by imagining themselves living within it. And this, ideally, is what we would
be seeking. It could be done of course not just for the judge, but also for

82. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL
AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990).
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each of the "others" there in the opinions in the "contemplative absorption in what is truly there" 83 which art requires. At each point in teaching
an opinion, the teacher should be thinking: how can my students locate
themselves, their lives, within this opinion, not just as a matter of understanding the issues, analyzing and responding to the arguments, deriving guidance for later use, or learning the language of the law-all important of course, but only enhanced for generalization and transference
when done in their full humanizing context-but as a matter of entering
the world of the practice? What is the attitude towards these "materials"
and experiences that I am implicitly encouraging? And what form of self
does it encourage?
Time and space seem to have vanished, so let me conclude with a quick
mention of my second suggestion: "love and reverence" for the materials
of legal practice. Part of what I would suggest is implicit in what I have
already said because one comes to "love what is [experienced] as most
alive." 8 4 YOU cannot teach students to love and revere the materials of

their art if you do not love and revere them yourself. Too often, we do not;
too often, we see our task as quite the opposite, as deconstructing the law
or critiquing it from a perspective of our choice and external to it, demonstrating for our students in doing so how to distance one's self from it.
Each case, each opinion, each statute, each new subject, then becomes for
us an exercise in doing exactly the opposite of what our students need to
be doing by imposing our will upon the materials. Again, this does not
mean we should not be critical. Each case, each opinion, each statute is
in its origin an inquiry into who we are as a people-an insight which can
come from the immersion I am describing-and so of course criticism is
central to what we do. But we can be critical as a good artist might as she
seeks to better the world of her art through her insights, her talents, her
unique love and reverence for its materials-from within the world of the
practice.8 5 There are abundant resources there for criticism.
The way of teaching I have just barely started to describe for you here
is difficult, but worth the trouble surely. In learning practices this way
our students can creatively discover a self, a more authentic one, which,
we then can offer to them in all honesty as the reason why becoming a
professional really can be a way toward a life well lived.

83.

WILLIAMS, GRACE AND NECESSITY, supra note 45, at 16.

84. Friedrich H61derlin, Socrates and Alcibiades, in POEMS AND FRAGMENTS (Michael
Hamberger trans., 1994).
85. What is to be avoided most in this is what is offered as "objective commentary."
Consider: "Engaged thinking necessarily does violence to objective commentary because its
goal is to reawaken that richer relationship to ourselves that is the basis for a richer relationship to texts." DAVIS, supra note 26, at 7.

2017]

THE ART OF SELF

765

VI. CODA

Josh remains with us, teaching those young lawyers, law students, and
all the others who worked within Team Joshua how to find their souls.
There in his words, his paintings, and his life is this gift to them as a
partial repayment, as I imagine this, for their helping him find his. Thus
may his soul not rest in peace for it continues to have too much to offer
for its good work to end now. Instead, may his name continue to be said
out loud.
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